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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
sidered by those who must rearrange the state's machinery to
conform with the constitutional requirements. Proper conceptual
orientation is essential-the English view that providing counsel
is the state's responsibility, not the bar's. The devices used in
German civil cases should be studied as a possible partial solution
to Louisiana's problem.
The behavior of too many states has far too long been self-
defeating- to a mandate they reply with inaction; to a chal-
lenge, With lethargy. Louisiana is now challenged to continue its
tradition of sound legal progress supported by spirited civic
action. The means are at our disposal.
Gerard A. Rault
FAIRNESS IN JUVENILE COURT*
Juvenile court legislation recognizes that children who break
the law should be treated different from adult lawbreakers, and
has sought to provide specialized correction and rehabilitation
through limited publicity, informal hearings, social work, and
probation.' In this area where little jurisprudence and few clear
principles can be found, this Comment focuses on possible solu-
tions to developing problems. It is concerned more with the
delinquent child who commits a wrongful act than the neglected
child who comes to the juvenile court because his parents have
failed to care for him properly.
Rather than punishing a child, seeking retribution from him
or merely protecting society from him, the juvenile court calls
on the social worker to provide guidance and correction and to
use the tools of modern psychology to help him into responsible
*This Comment is a result of the author's participation in the LSU Law
School's fieldwork in modern social legislation project. In this program, law
students worked with social agencies during the summer of 1966 to observe their
activities and to assess the impact of social and welfare laws. The project was
financed by the American Bar Association through the Ford Foundation and was
directed by Visiting Professor Walter J. Wadlington III and Mrs. Leila Cutshaw.
Appreciation is expressed to the staff of the East Baton Rouge Family Court
Center for its assistance and advice in preparing this article.
1. See LA. R.S. 13:1561-1599 (1950) ; Standard Juvenile Court Act; Standard
Family Court Act; Garrett, When the Lawyer Comes to Juvenile Court, mimeo-
graphed materials, St. Louis University Institute for Delinquency Control, 3d
Inst. 1966; GLLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1950); Paulsen,
Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547 (1957) ; Comment, 10
LOYOLA L. REV. 88 (1960).
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adulthood. Juvenile court philosophy reflects the inclination that
a child is not as culpable for his acts as an adult, so he is not to
be punished. 2 Also present is the traditional notion that society,
for its preservation, has an interest in the proper rearing of
children. Since the first juvenile court was established in 1899,8
all states have adopted legislation providing special courts for
juvenile offenders. In these courts, often termed non-criminal
or civil, the constitutional and statutory protections of the crim-
inal law have not been applied. 4
Meanwhile, modern penology has attempted to apply some
of these principles, notably individualized punishment and re-
habilitation, to adults.5 The emphasis in criminal law has
switched from retribution and punishment to emphasis on re-
habilitation and preparation of the criminal for effective par-
ticipation in society. As the treatment of adults and minors has
merged somewhat, it has become apparent that children often
receive little of the rehabilitation and treatment promised in
exchange for lack of criminal law protections, often being denied
liberty and subjected to control without effective safeguards.
Responding to this, a movement has begun to provide juveniles
with more effective protection against unjust incarceration and
to award them some of the rights of their older brethren. 6 This
is in the context of a rising incidence of delinquency, increases
in the number and proportion of children in society and aware-
ness of the inadequacies of most juvenile courts.7
It is recognized that while not "criminal," juvenile courts
are not truly "civil."'8 The courts are being freed from a tyranny
2. See State v. Malone, 156 La. 617, 100 So. 788 (1924).
3. The first juvenile court was established in Illinois. Earlier, special treat-
ment of juvenile offenders was provided within existing court structures. See
Beemsterboer, The Juvenile Court - Benevolence in the Star Chamber, 50 J. CRIm.
L., C. & P.S. 464 (1960).
4. In re Tillotson, 225 La. 573, 73 So. 2d 466 (1954) ; In re Cook, 145 So. 2d
627 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts,
46 CORN. L.Q. 387, 392 (1961) ; Beemsterboer, The Ju venile Court - Benevolence
in the Star Chamber, 50 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 464 (1960).
5. Comment, Employment of Social Investigation Reports in Criminal and
Juvenile Proceedings, 58 COLum. L. REV. 702 (1958).
6. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) ; Shioutakeon v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224
(D.D.C. 1955) ; In re Garland, 160 So. 2d 340 (l.a. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; In re
Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 524 (1954) ; Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile
Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547 (1957).
7. Vall Street Journal, Aug. 10, 1966, col. 1, p. 1; Anticau, Constitutional
Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORN. L.Q. 387 (1961); Glueck, Roscoe Pound
and Criminal Justice, 10 CRIIME & DELINQUENCY 314 (1964).
8. Some Louisiana courts have more correctly termed them "quasi-criminal."
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of semantics and it is being realized that children need more
protection in proceedings that can make them wards of the state,
deprive them of their liberty until majority, stigmatize them as
"reform school kids" and even de-parentize them.9 The question
is how much protection they should have. Since the consequences
may be drastic, the answer must be as much protection as is
possible without impairing effective detection and treatment of
delinquency. To give a child all the rights available to adults
could result in a budding delinquent getting off, in a lack of
rehabilitation for those who need it, and in requiring the type
of hearing that would make effective rehabilitation difficult.
While the consequences of juvenile court proceedings can be
serious, they are not usually as serious as those of criminal pro-
ceedings; often, supervision and treatment are provided and are
successful. Great care must be exercised in guiding the child
who breaks the law; his first contact with the law is often the
juvenile court, and lifelong attitudes can be formed by this
contact.
Juvenile courts are hybrids whose procedures should be de-
termined in an individual process, weighing different policies
and interests. This paper develops such a process for arrest,
detention, and some aspects of the hearing. In these areas, it
seeks to recommend procedures that will ensure proper rehabili-
tation and treatment without unfairly depriving children of lib-
erty and their right to remain with their family.
ARREST
Adult arrest standards are rigorous and getting stricter;
warrants are favored over arrests without warrants, and arrests
without warrants require probable cause, an inexact test being
redefined into a substantial requirement. 10 Should this high
standard apply to apprehension of juveniles? Influential uni-
In re Owen, 170 La. 255, 127 So. 619 (1930) ; State ex rel. Herbert v. Renaud,
157 La. 776, 103 So. 101 (1925).
0. LA. R.S. 13:1580 (1950) illustrates the broad discretionary powers lodged
in the juvenile courts for making dispositions, including probation or supervision
in the child's home or in the care of any suitable person, assignment to the custody
of a public or private institution in or out of the state, or other disposition "as
the court may deem to be for the best interest of the child," including commitment
to a mental institution.
Under R.S. 13:1580.1 (traffic hearings) juveniles may be fined up to $200.
This casts serious doubt on the non-criminal nature of the juvenile court in at
least this type of proceeding. Cf. Comment, 10 LOYOLA L. REV. 88 (1960).
10. Comments, 26 LA. L. REv. 789 (1966), 26 LA. L. Rav. 802 (1966).
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form legislation adopts a lower standard ;11 most commentators
oppose applying the adult test to children ;12 the courts have not
yet required the adult standards. 13 Louisiana legislation pre-
scribes no standard for arrest or apprehension of juveniles, and
the Louisiana courts have not required adult standards. 14
Widely held is the view that apprehension of a juvenile is
not an arrest.15 The standard acts so specify, 16 and Louisiana
legislation refers to the "holding of a child during the period in
which he is awaiting a hearing of his case" as detention rather
than arrest.17 This definition may be sufficient to ward off
fourth amendment arrest requirements for juveniles since a
distinction exists between the consequences of apprehending a
juvenile and arresting an adult.'8 Perhaps a more realistic con-
cept is to consider such apprehension an arrest within the mean-
ing of the fourth amendment, for the child in police or court
custody is deprived of liberty. The fourth amendment might
then apply, but with the recognition that because children are
being dealt with, the probable cause and reasonableness tests
would be legitimately more lenient. If the fourth amendment is
not applied, there remains the problem of formulating constitu-
tional requirements for children under a fourteenth amendment
due process test.
Under either view, adult requirements should not be applied.
Apprenhension of juveniles is often for their own protection,
and the results of the apprehension are not as drastic as for
adults, for the juvenile is not subjected to criminal penalties.
11. Standard Family Court Act § 16; Standard Juvenile Court Act § 15.
12. E.g., Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547
(1957).
13. E.g., In re Tillotson, 225 La. 573, 73 So. 2d 466 (1954).
14. See LA. R.S. 13:1561-1599 (1950). It could be that some provisions of
the statute providing for detention of children could create some general arrest
standards, especially R.S. 13:1577. See text accompanying note 40 infra. See
also In re Garland, 160 So. 2d 340 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) ; In re Cook, 145
So. 2d 627 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
15. MIYREN & SWANSON, POLICE WORK WITH CHILDREN 35 (Children's Bureau
Publication 399-1962), and state statutes there cited.
16. Standard Juvenile Court Act § 15; Standard Family Court Act § 16.
17. LA. R.S. 13:1569 (1950). See also id. 13:1577; but cf. LA. CODE OF
CRIM. PROCEDURE art. 201 (1966) defining arrest as "the taking of one person
into custody by another. To constitute arrest there must be an actual restraint
of the person. The restraint may be imposed by force or may result from the
submission of the person arrested to the custody of the one arresting him."
18. Under the criminal law, sentence may encompass capital punishment to
probation. In the juvenile court, a child is usually placed on probation; the




Since Louisiana does not provide for transfer of juveniles to
criminal courts, fewer possibilities of criminal consequences
arise than in some states.19 The state has a legitimate parens
patriae interest in seeking to correct a misguided child; if such
correction is reasonably attempted, there should be less ground
needed for detention of juveniles than for adults. If post-arrest
detention procedures and safeguards on police questioning are
adopted to complement liberal arrest provisions, the child's
rights would be adequately protected. The courts' tendency to
strengthen adult arrest requirements reflects a distaste for the
methods used by police in questioning and detaining persons
after arrest. If the juvenile courts provide proper post-arrest
safeguards, this psychological element could be removed from
the process of formulating juvenile arrest requirements. Also,
the nature of the juvenile court and its protective aspects justify
a lesser standard for juvenile apprehension.
Louisiana seems to have no explicit standards for apprehen-
sion.20 The legislation apparently establishes none, and the courts
have not directly created any minimum requirement. 21 Thus,
police are left to exercise their discretion without the guidelines
which are needed to ensure fairness to the juvenile.
Little difficulty arises when the juvenile is caught committing
a crime or when the adult probable cause test is met ;22 he should
be arrested then. Instances in which lesser reason to arrest is
present - the majority of cases - are the problem. Knowledge
that a boy comes from a poor family situation or that a girl has a
record of past offenses should not be sufficient; neither should
bare suspicion. However, loitering on the streets late at night
should be sufficient to require police action in some circum-
stances, at least in view of the protective aspects of the appre-
hension.
The Standard Family Court Act 23 provides for apprehension
19. Most states provide for such transfer. See Standard Juvenile Court Act§ 10; cf. State v. Bedford, 193 La. 105, 190 So. 347 (1939) ; State v. Dabon, 162
La. 1075, 111 So. 461 (1927).
20. See note 14 supra and text accompanying note 40 infra,
21. See In re Garland, 160 So. 2d 340 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964), in which the
court approved the taking of juveniles into custody when found on the street late
at night.
22. The fourth amendment probable cause standards have been applied as
minimum requirements for arrest of adults. Since the standards for children are
usually accepted as being less stringent, it seems evident that the questionable
area is whether a child can be arrested with less grounds. Virtually no writers
or cases argue that the standard for children should be higher than for adults.
23. Standard Family Court Act § 16.
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if (1) a juvenile violates a law or ordinance in an officer's pres-
ence, (2) the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the child
has committed a felony, (3) the child would be endangered by
his surroundings and removal is necessary to protect him, or
(4) the officer believes the child has run away from home. A
leading authority, Monrad Paulsen, formulates the requirement
as "A policeman should be able to detain a child if he has reason-
able grounds to believe the child is delinquent," admittedly a
broader power than the standard act confers.24 A good method
would be to adopt the standard act's more definite enumeration
,of grounds to arrest, in addition to a modification of Paulsen's
blanket formula.
The standard act's general rule - reasonable grounds to be-
lieve the child has committed a felony - may appear stricter
than Paulsen's - reasonable grounds to believe the child is
delinquent - but the standard act's enumeration of dangerous
surroundings and running away from home as grounds for
arrest lessens the distinction. What remains uncovered by the
standard act and covered by Paulsen would be reasonable grounds
to believe a child has committed a misdemeanor or violated an
ordinance. In this class of cases, it seems that a juvenile should
be subject to apprehension; he has possibly broken society's rules.
Society may need protection, and the state has an interest in
rehabilitating the child. Also, the child needs protection when it
appears he is seriously neglected, so he should be subject to pro-
tective apprehension in such a case.
A possible statute could provide:
A juvenile may be taken into custody :25
(1) When there exists probable cause to arrest an adult,
(2) When there exists probable cause to believe the child is
delinquent or neglected. (Under La. R.S. 13:1570 (4)
and (5) defining delinquency, this would be probable
cause to arrestwhen the child violates any law or ordi-
nance or the rules governing school attendance. Under
(1), (2) and (3) of the statute, dealing with neglect,
24. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547, 551
(1957).
25. Authorities prefer to use "apprehension," "detention," or "taking into cus-
tody," rather than "arrest," partly because of the criminal connotations of the
word arrest. Cf. text following note 19 supra.
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this would mean apprehension of an abandoned or im-
properly supported child, one who has run away or is
incorrigible, or one whose associations are injurious to
his welfare.)
(3) In these specific instances:
(a) When the child is endangered by his surroundings
and removal is necessary to protect him,
(b) When there exists insufficient probable cause to
apprehend under sections 1, 2 or 3 (a), but the child
is present at some place which, because of the nature
of the place or the time, is manifestly unwholesome;
however, this section only authorizes questioning at
the scene; no further apprehension is allowed un-
less additional information brings the case under
another section of this provision.
These standards are not rigid - less rigid than some suggest,
but more so than no standard, which Louisiana seems to have
now. Adoption of such apprehension rules should 'depend on
adoption of specific post-arrest procedures, policemen trained to
deal expertly with juveniles, and a professionally qualified juve-
nile court staff, to insure that the standards for arrest are not
abused.
DETENTION AND QUESTIONING
To be consistent with the philosophy of juvenile court legisla-
tion, a child should not be incarcerated pending a hearing unless
necessary to protect him or to protect society from him. It would
be legitimately protecting a child to detain him when he is physi-
cally neglected by parents, when serious mental disorders seem
present, or when he has no other place to go. It would be proper
protection of society to detain when the crime a child is suspected
of committing is a major felony, the presumption of guilt is
great, and past behavior or present attitude indicate release may
be'followed by further misbehavior. In all other instances, a
child should be released to his parents. Detention should never
be a means of punishment or "treatment" before hearing.26
26. In general, see MYREN & SWANSON, POLICE WORK WITH CHILDREN
(Children's Bureau Publication 399-1962).
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The decision to confine should not be made by the police, but
by an officer of the juvenile court, preferably the intake of-
ficer, 7 under policies established by the judge. Of course, quali-
fied patrol officers should be allowed discretion to dispose of
cases with warnings and without detention, under court-estab-
lished guidelines conforming to statutory minimums.28 But, when
a policeman believes detention is necessary, he should obtain
permission from a court official. A qualified social worker with
training in delinquency correction knowing the policies of the
court and its philosophy should make the decision since he is
more apt to decide in the best interest of the child. This require-
ment is analogous to taking an adult before a committing mag-
istrate as soon as possible,29 and should guarantee protection of
the juvenile's rights to counterbalance liberal arrest standards.
If detention is authorized by a court officer, it should be in
a special detention home and not in a jail where adults are kept.30
If no juvenile home exists children should be detained in a com-
pletely separate part of the jail.3 1 While exposure to the de-
pravity of a jail might have slight therapeutic value to deter a
juvenile delinquent, it is scarcely worth subjecting a child to
the company and instruction of major felons and homosexuals.
Experts argue that a juvenile should have a right to bail ;32
this is too much of a concession. Children should have the right
not to be detained at all pending a hearing, and to be released to
parents immediately upon apprehension except in the cases out-
lined previously.30 When it would be unwise to release children
to parents who have neglected them, arrangements should be
made with other relatives.
When a court officer authorizes detention, it should be limited
to 24 hours; a child should then be released unless further deten-
27. LA. R.S. 13:1574 (1950) authorizes disposition of cases informally without
court action. Such disposition is usually by the intake officer. The intake officer
is also the screening agent who first deals with a child referred to the court and
decides what immediate disposition -detention, informal counseling, filing a peti-
tion, further investigation, assigning probation officers-will be made.
28. MYREN & SWANSON, POLICE WORK WITH CHILDREN (Children's Bureau
Publication 399-1962).
29. Cf. Comment, 26 LA. L. REV. 666, 686 (1966).
30. LA. R.S. 13:1577 (1950).
31. Ibid.
32. Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORN. L.Q. 387, 393
(1961); Beemsterboer, The Juvenile Court - Benevolence in the Star Chamber,
50 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 464, 469 (1958) ; Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile
Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547 (1957).
33. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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tion is authorized by the judge or a petition is filed.3 4 Leaving
further detention up to the judge would be an important protec-
tion for the child, would encourage expeditious police work, and
would tend to prevent delay.
Admittedly, these guidelines are not new; most of them are
required by Louisiana law, although not so explicitly or perva-
sively.85 Present law requires a juvenile apprehended by police
to be released to a parent or guardian upon a promise to produce
the child in court "unless impracticable or inadvisable or has
been otherwise ordered by the court. " 30 Vagueness in the excep-
tion clause causes difficulty, for it is not clear what is "im-
practicable or inadvisable." A more explicit standard would
better assure protection of the juvenile's rights. However, a
recent case37 indicates the courts will interpret the statute in
favor of liberal release to parents: A 15-year-old boy was taken
into custody when found on the street at 3:15 a.m., taken to a
police station, and questioned until 9 a.m. Although the decision
rested on other grounds (involuntary confession) the court in-
dicated strongly that the police action was improper:
"A child so taken into custody merely for his own protec-
tion, however, should by all means be returned to his home
or otherwise afforded the protection he needs; as a minimum,
the provisions of LSA-R.S. 13:1577 should be followed.
"It would, we say, have been quite proper and conducive
to Garland's welfare to have taken him off the street and to
his home. But the police had no authority to arrest Garland
without a warrant for his arrest just as they would have had
no authority to arrest a major under the same circumstances;
LSA-R.S. 15:59 and 15:60.
"We are of the opinion that under both LSA-R.S. 13:1577
and LSA-R.S. 15:59 the detention and interrogation of Gar-
land by the Kenner police were unauthorized by law."38
The statute requires that, if not released, the child should be
taken immediately to the juvenile court or place of detention
designated by the court or probation officer.3 9 No child is to be
34. Cf. LA. R.S. 13:1577 (1950).
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. In re Garland, 160 So. 2d 340 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
38. Id. at 342.
39. LA. R.S. 13:1577 (1950) : "Whenever a child is taken into detention,
[Vol. XXVII
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confined in a police station or jail, except those 15 years old or
older who may be placed in part of a jail entirely separate from
adults. Criminal penalties can be assessed an officer who vio-
lates these provisions.
While making these explicit provisions, the statute clouds
their meaning by further providing that it is not to be construed
to forbid an officer from immediately detaining a child found
violating a law or ordinance or whose surroundings endanger
his welfare. Also provided is that an officer detaining a child
shall immediately, and in any event within twenty-four hours,
report the fact to the court and then proceed as usual. 40 Reading
these potentially conflicting parts of the statute together might
permit a reconciliation by considering the latter section to refer
more to apprehension than detention in the sense of keeping in
custody for a period of time. Thus, the earlier-mentioned safe-
guards on keeping in custody would remain in effect as clearly
stated and the latter provision would be some kind of arrest
standard.4
Since few parishes provide detention homes for juveniles,42
it is unfortunate that many children must be confined in jails.
unless it is impracticable or inadvisable or has been otherwise ordered by the
court, he shall be released to the care of a parent or custodian, upon the promise
of such parent or custodian to bring the child to the court at the time fixed. The
court may require a bond from such person for the appearance of the child; and
upon the failure of such person to produce said child when directed to do so,
the court may, in addition to declaring the bond forfeited, punish said person as
in case of contempt. If not so released such child shall be taken immediately to
the court or to the place of detention designated by the court or probation officer.
Any police officer, sheriff, probation officer, or other peace officer violating any
of the terms of this article may be judged guilty of contributing to the act or
condition which would bring a child within the provisions of R.S. 13:1561 through
13:1592. Pending further disposition of the case, the child may be released to
the care of a parent, agency or other person appointed by the court, or be de-
tained in such place as shall be designated by the court or probation officer, subject
to further order.
"Nothing in R.S. 13:1561 through 13:1592 shall be construed as forbidding
any peace officer from immediately detaining any child who is found violating
any law or ordinance, or whose surroundings are such as to endanger his welfare.
In every case the officer detaining any child shall immediately, and in any event
within twenty-four hours, report the fact to the court or probation officer and
the case shall then be proceeded with as provided in R.S. 13:1561 through
13:1592.
"No child shall be confined in any police station, prison, or jail or be trans-
ported or detained in association with criminal, vicious, or dissolute persons;
except that a child fifteen years of age or older may be placed in a jail or other
place of detention for adults, but in a room or ward entirely separate from adults.
40. Ibid.
41. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
42. Detention homes are provided in Baton Rouge, New Orleans, Shreveport,
and Monroe. One is to be constructed in Jefferson Parish.
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However, it is provided that they may be detained in a private
home or in a public or private institution.43
It seems difficult to expand the protections in this area.
Detention should be authorized when serious danger to self or
society exists, and safeguards on even this limited class of deten-
tions are ample. The thrust here should be to make statutory
guidelines more specific and to enforce present rules. The former
would be helpful, for while the enlightened courts interpret the
statute within the juvenile court philosophy, not all courts are so
enlightened.
However, much room for improvement exists in the matter
of police questioning. There is a coercive aspect to all police
interrogation; if such questioning is coercive to adults,44 it is
much more so when scared, naive children are involved. Both
police and court official questioning must be re-examined in the
light of Miranda v. Arizona45 and the strict standards for adult
questioning it established. It would be hard to justify extending
the complete coverage of the fifth amendment prohibition against
self-incrimination as interpreted by Miranda to a child, even
though wards of the state presumably require more protection
than adults. In dealing with children under fifteen, and to some
extent, in dealing with those fifteen to seventeen, the privilege
is somewhat meaningless. A child of this age cannot fully com-
prehend what it means to incriminate himself; he is less able
to cope with refined interrogation techniques; he is in no position
to make an intelligent decision as to whether to talk or not; the
consequences of his actions are not understood by him; he may
be incapable of waiving his rights and of understanding his
rights.4o This reasoning would perhaps lead to requiring that
he be not questioned at all. But such a rule would emasculate the
court. The aim of questioning by probation officers is ostensibly
not to convict, but to provide the basis for rehabilitative treat-
ment. Questioning and interviewing by court workers is aimed
at eliciting an over-all view of the child's personality, back-
ground, and social conditions.47 In many cases, the child is not
43. LA. R.S. 13:1577 (1950).
44. For a recent and thorough statement about the coercive aspects of police
detention, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
45. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
46. Cf. Williams v. Huff, 142 F.2d 91, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1944) ; Antieau, Con-
stitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORN. L.Q. 387, 406 (1961).
47. A discussion of the preparation and use of social studies is found in
Comment, 58 COLUm. L. REV. 702 (1958); see also GILMA & Low, TRAINING
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brought to a hearing and is counselled informally; questioning
is required to facilitate this process.48 If the aim of the court is
to rehabilitate, the worker must inquire about the commission
of a delinquent act, the circumstances around it, and the reasons
for doing it; this information is the basis of an intelligent coun-
-selling program. Some questioning by police is necessary to
protect society and solve crimes. Yet, the justification for the
state interfering and providing treatment is the fact that the
child has done the act that requires treatment. It must first be
established that the child did commit the act.40 Also, realistically
considering the non-civil nature of deprivation of liberty, the
child could be convicting himself.
A possible solution is a right to counsel during interrogation.
But presence of counsel during questioning by social workers
would make good social analysis difficult. It would be prac-
ticable to have counsel present during police questioning as in
criminal cases, although appointed counsel at this stage would
create problems and would be expensive. A simpler solution with
better possibilities of practical operation would be to allow ques-
tioning to solve crime and formulate a social summary, but to
exclude all statements made by a child during questioning from
the determination of whether the child has committed a delin-
quent act.50 At the hearing, independent evidence or admission
would be required to support an adjudication of delinquency.
Once commission of the act is proved, the child's statements could
be heard to assist in making a suitable disposition. Such a pro-
cedure would not unduly burden a court and would provide the
child with significant protection.
Police questioning should be conducted under supervision of
the court. Presence of probation officers during questioning is
a possible solution, but it might interfere with the development
of a good relationship with the child. If there is a detention
home, questioning should be there rather than in jail. If there
is no home, some standards as to the time and place allowed for
questioning should be established by the court.
FOR JUVENILE PROBATION OFFICERS (Children's Bureau Publication 398-1962).
48. See note 27 supra; LA. R.S. 13:1574 (1950) provides for informal pro-
cedure without court hearing in some cases.
49. See In re Pratts, 222 La. 126, 62 So. 2d 124 (1953); In re Sherrill, 206
La. 457, 19 So. 2d 203 (1944) ; In re Garland, 160 So. 2d 340 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1964).




The Louisiana legislation does not create standards for police
interrogation of juveniles. The courts have adopted the question-
ing regulations applicable to adults to a limited extent, at least
with respect to involuntary confessions. In re Garland held:
"This court is persuaded that the confessions thus obtained were
not freely and voluntarily made and cannot be used against the
juveniles . . . nor be admitted in evidence .... -51 Quoting from
Gallegos v. Colorado,52 the court continued:
"The youth of the petitioner, the long detention, the fail-
ure to send for his parents, the failure immediately to bring
him before the judge of the Juvenile Court, the failure to
see to it that he had the advice of a lawyer or friend-all
these combine to make us conclude that the formal confes-
sion on which this conviction may have rested . ..was ob-
tained in violation of due process. ' ' 63
The positions of the United States Supreme Court and the
Louisiana courts indicate that significant protection of a juve-
nile during detention and post-arrest questioning are required.
As this view developed before Miranda, it would not be sur-
prising for the high court to require the standard of that case
for juveniles. Court officials and police would thus be wise to
adjust their procedures to insure effective protection of juvenile
rights in this area.
HEARING
The public is excluded from juvenile court hearings. La. R.S.
13:1579 allows only persons with a direct interest to be present.54
Protecting the juvenile from public stigma and the psychological
disruptions of a public trial are strong justification for this
procedure.55 However, a juvenile, his parents, or even the court
(in limited circumstances) should be permitted to waive this
secrecy and to have in attendance anyone the juvenile desires,
even the general public. While few juvenile courts are star
chambers, 56 the spectre of secrecy can lead to speculation by
51. 160 So. 2d 340, 342 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
52. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
53. 160 So. 2d 340, 343 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
54. See State v. Cronin, 220 La. 233, 56 So. 2d 242 (1951).
55. Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CoRn. L.Q. 387, 398
(1961) ; Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547, 560
(1957).
56. "The powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those
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the public whose approval is necessary for the courts' efficient
functioning, and could lead to carelessness by a judge whose ac-
tions are not scrutinized by the public. While the public's pres-
ence could harm a juvenile, its absence could lead to inquisitorial
tyranny. Further, the right to a public trial is for the defend-
ant's protection, rather than society's; the juvenile should be
allowed that protection if he or his proper representative re-
quests it. Of course, no child should be deprived of the company
of his parents at the hearing; their presence should be required,
for a juvenile's problems are related to the family and solution
of the problems requires family assistance and understanding.
It should be recognized that the hearing is a two-part process
involving (1) determining whether a child is delinquent or neg-
lected, and (2) making a disposition in the child's best interests.
Some writers recognize this, but many statutes, including Lou-
isiana's, do not.57 In making dispositions, social studies, opinion
testimony by probation workers and others, psychological test
results, and information about the family should be received;
nothing should be privileged at this second stage. However, more
safeguards should surround the determination that the child has
committed an act justifying state intervention, since the conse-
quences of that intervention are serious.5" Admissions of guilt
should be lightly received; the juvenile should not be forced to
incriminate himself at the hearing. No adjudication of delin-
quency should rest on a child's confession or admission alone;
independent evidence should be required.5 9 Too often, these safe-
guards are not maintained.
In a one-hearing procedure, it is difficult to separate the
functions of adjudication and disposition. Judges often see social
of o ur juvenile courts and Courts of Domestic Relations. It is well known that
too often the placing of a child in a home or even in an institution is done casually,
perfunctorily or even arbitrarily. Moreover, effective preventive work through
these Courts requires looking into much more than the bad external conditions of
a household, such as poverty or neglect or lack of discipline. Internal conditions,
a complex of habits, attitudes and reactions, may have to be dealt with and this
means administrative treatment of the most intimate affairs of life. Even with the
most superior personnel, these tribunals call for legal checks." Quoted in Glueck,
Roscoe Pound and Criminal Justice, 10 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 314 (1964).
57. Beemsterboer, The Juvenile Court - Benevolence in the Star Chanber,
50 J. CRatI. L., C. & P.S. 464, 472 (1960). LA. R.S. 13 :1579 (1950) authorizes
a one-hearing procedure without delineating the different aspects.
58. See State v. Tomasella, 200 La. 60, 7 So. 2d 615 (1942).
59. Louisiana jurisprudence does not adhere to this view. In re Tillotson,
225 La. 573, 73 So. 2d 466 (19,54) held that a child's uncorroborated statement
was sufficient basis for a juvenile court ruling that a child was in need of the
court's protection. See also State v. Cronin, 220 La. 233, 56 So. 2d 242 (1951)
In re Cook, 145 So. 2d 627 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
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studies before a hearing in order to be better informed about the
case and to use it in interviewing the child, so it is difficult to
conduct the adjudicatory part of the hearing without being in-
fluenced by social reports geared toward disposition.0° A pos-
sible and attractive solution, used in New York City and Illinois,61
is the two-hearing approach. The first is devoted to a determina-
tion of whether a child committed an act. At the second, social
studies and all types of testimony are heard to aid in disposition.
Of course, this requires additional time and possible additional
detention of the child. It may be more expensive. However, it
would remove the need for extensive social summaries in cases
in which a child is not adjudicated delinquent or neglected. If
the juvenile or his attorney did not wish to contest an adjudica-
tion of delinquency, the first hearing could be waived. An interim
between adjudication and disposition could facilitate arrange-
ments for referral to social agencies and institutions.
Some authorities advocate abolition of the use of evidence
that would not be admissible in criminal courts. Again, however,
the nature of juvenile courts should be analyzed and rules of
evidence framed in that context. The criminal and civil courts,
for example, have been hampered by a complex hearsay rule that
is being seriously questioned . 2 If proper weight can be given to
hearsay - a judge sitting alone should be qualified to evaluate
it - it should be admitted.
If standards are established for apprehension and detention
of juveniles, evidence obtained in violation of those rules should
be excluded. The standards required by the fourth amendment
should apply to exclude evidence obtained through unconstitu-
tional searches and seizures. This would be a further check on
police procedures and would protect the juvenile from unjust
penalties. In the case of neglect adjudications, separate stand-
ards for searches and seizures might be allowed. For the reasons
discussed earlier, statements made by a child in detention or
before the hearing should not be admitted.6
The juvenile should be afforded a right to counsel.6 4 A lawyer
with training in finding and weighing facts would assist the
60. Comment, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 717, 719 (1958).
61. Ibid.; New York Domestic Relations Court Act § 61; ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
37, § 701-1 (Supp. 1966).
62. E.g., ALI MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE ch. VI (1942) ; Paulsen, Fairness to
the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547 (1957).
63. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
64. Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORN. L.Q. 387,
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child at the hearing. One of the deficient areas of the hearing
is the fact-finding process on which a decision is made; it is
possible for the conclusions of social workers inexperienced in
the fact-finding, credibility-weighing process of the law to stand
uncontradicted. A trained lawyer could put such testimony in
perspective so that it is given proper weight. This skill of an
attorney would balance the disadvantages of the use of hearsay.
A lawyer is able to cross-examine witnesses and further the
search for truth; he can relate to the child and his parents the
policies and dispositions of the court so they will better cooperate
in the treatment process. A lawyer also serves as a therapeutic
agent; it is reassuring for the child to know that his parents or
someone cares enough to provide every possible protection. These
benefits, of course, are in addition to seeing that the child re-
ceives the benefit of his growing arsenal of rights.6 5 Surely, this
is more than sufficient reason to allow a juvenile and his parents
to be represented by counsel. This representation should extend
to both the adjudicatory and the disposition hearing.
Louisiana legislation is silent about this right in juvenile
courts. Many states do provide for representation by retained
counsel and some require appointed counsel for indigents.6 6 The
United States Supreme Court has not decided that either ap-
pointed or retained counsel be permitted in the usual juvenile
court hearings. In some states making no statutory provision
for counsel, the courts have established a right to retained c6un-
sel based on the general provisions regarding counsel in the state
and federal constitutions. The question has not been presented
in Louisiana, 67 but it is the practice of most juvenile courts to
welcome lawyers at hearings and, in some cases, during intake
interviews.6 8 This is a wise practice, and should be incorporated
in the legislation to insure effective protection in all cases.
Effective protection may also require appointing counsel for
indigent juveniles. The implications of the Gideon-Escobedo-
404 (1961); Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547,
568 (1957).
65. In general see Skoler & Tenney, Attorney Representation in Juvenile Court,
4 J. FAMILY L. 77 (1964).
66. Id. at 78.
67. Cf. State v. Cronin, 220 La. 233, 56 So. 2d 242 (1.951) (judge could ex-
clude attorney, who previously intervened in an action, at the hearing when the
juvenile stated she did not desire an attorney and her mother was present).
68. Cf. Skoler & Tenney, Attorney Representation in Juvenile Court, 4 J.
FAMILY L. 77, 96 (1964).
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Miranda decisions and their elevation of the right to counsel 9
present serious questions to the juvenile courts. However, re-
quiring appointed counsel is a serious step that must be care-
fully made. The expense would be great; but, if associated with
a public defender system, the costs would be kept reasonable low.
It would seem that appointed counsel is not presently constitu-
tionally required since the penalty that can be assessed is pos-
sibly not a "serious consequence" within the appointed counsel
requirements of Gideon v. Wainwright, ° at least under one pos-
sible interpretation of Gideon.7 But some states are now re-
quiring appointed counsel.72 The United States Supreme Court
has stressed its importance for juveniles in general, although the
statements quoted below are in connection with a hearing to
decide whether to transfer a juvenile to a criminal court and not
the usual juvenile court hearing:
"Correspondingly, we conclude that an opportunity for a
hearing which may be informal, must be given the child prior
to entry of a waiver order. Under Black, the child is entitled
to counsel in connection with a waiver proceeding, and under
Watkins, counsel is entitled to see the child's social records.
These rights are meaningless - an illusion, a mockery - un-
less counsel is given an opportunity to function.
"The right to representation by counsel is not a formality.
It is a grudging gesture to a ritualistic requirement. It is of
the essence of justice. ' '7 3
Lack of counsel, however, in the better courts with qualified
judges and professionally trained staffs, does not seriously.
penalize the child. But too few courts have specially trained
judges and expert staffs. Lawyers would have to be re-oriented
to function properly in the informal juvenile court hearings, for
few lawyers know how to conduct a case in juvenile court. This
is due in part to lack of sufficient training in the law schools in
the field of juvenile court practice. 74 Also, the juvenile is af-
forded some protection by a probation staff whose aim is to
assist him in rehabilitation. This is a close question - but the
69. See Comment, 26 LA. L. REv. 666 (1966).
70. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
71. Comment, 26 LA. L. REV. 666 (1966).
72. See Skoler & Tenney, Attorney Repre8entation in Juvenile Court, 4 J.
FAMILY L. 77 (1964).
73. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966).
74. Skoler & Tenney, Attorney Representation in Juvenile Court, 4 J. FAMILY
L. 77, 88 (1964).
(Vol. XXVII
COMMENTS
cost to society should be legitimately a great one before it is
allowed to counterbalance the important right to appointed
counsel.
The juvenile and his counsel or parents should have access to
the information the court has in its social survey of the child.7 5
It would at least insure a correct report since the parents or
the child could dispute incorrect or exaggerated parts. In some
cases, social information about inadequate parents might be
harmful if disclosed to the child; in others, social workers
would be unable to get information if confidentiality were not
maintained. In those instances, the information could be dis-
closed to an attorney rather than to the juvenile or his parents.7 6
In any event, the right to a hearing is worthless and rehabilita-
tion a disservice if not supported by as much correct information
as possible; full disclosure would increase the reliability of this
information.
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
As mentioned earlier, juvenile court procedures are subject
to increasing criticism, and courts have been active in affording
more rights to juveniles accused of delinquency. An authorita-
tive statement on the child's constitutional rights can be expected
soon from the Supreme Court case of In re Gault,77 which pre-
sents for decision whether Arizona's Juvenile Code deprives an
accused child of due process in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. It affords the court the opportunity to establish standards
in the matter of right to counsel, propriety of informal hearings,
right to appeal, and to have proceedings transcribed, whether
the privilege against self-incrimination applies, whether a right
of confrontation exists, and whether a general allegation of de-
linquency is sufficiently definite. The court, in view of its pro-
tection of rights of offenders in general and juveniles in par-
ticular7 8 in recent times, would be reversing a trend if it failed
to expand the juvenile's protections.
75. Id. at 86.
76. Comment, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 702, 725 (1958).
77. 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965), app. granted, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3428
(U.S. June 20, 1966) (no. 116).




Legislation clarifying and establishing the rights of the child
in juvenile court is needed; but these rights are of little value
without effective implementation. What is required even more
is better juvenile court judges and staffs.
Policemen dealing with juveniles must be trained to carry
out their specialized role. Requirements that juveniles be de-
tained in special homes and not in jails are of no value when no
detention homes are built. Allowing or requiring lawyers in
juvenile court hearings is a pseudo-right if attorneys do not
understand the philosophy of the juvenile courts. Requiring ap-
proval of an intake officer before detaining a juvenile does no
good if the officer is not professionally trained in juvenile de-
linquency corrections. Rehabilitation and treatment are illusory
promises when delinquents are confined in overcrowded indus-
trial schools without adequate staffs. Probation is no answer
when the probation officer is incompetent or overworked.
It is here much work must be done, and done well, if the
problem is to be solved. This goal of rehabilitation cannot be
met by the lawyer - he can only suggest guidelines to protect
rights- but by the legislator providing the resources and au-
thority to establish a good system, and by social workers who
will provide treatment and rehabilitation.
Lee Hargrave
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